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In this chapter we describe the general equilibrium approach to the
analysis of the impact of taxes which underlies our later evaluation of
U.S. tax policies. We begin with a discussion of the pathbreaking work of
Arnold Harberger (1959,1962,1966,1974). Harberger's analyses repre-
sent a great advance over partial equilibrium models, but they have their
own shortcomings. In particular, the Harberger model quickly becomes
intractable in dealing with more than two sectors or two factors. Also, the
model is not suited for considering large policy changes. We use a model
that overcomes these shortcomings. After dealing with the Harberger
model in section 2.1, we lay the foundations for our own model. In
section 2.2 the essential elements of general equilibrium models are
presented. Then we discuss the incorporation of taxes into the model in
section 2.3. Section 2.4 covers computational techniques. Section 2.5
follows with a discussion of computations in which the size of government
is held constant, even though the configuration of taxes is changed.
Finally, we discuss a method by which the number of prices that must be
computed can be reduced greatly. The details of our model of the United
States and the data follow in chapters 3 through 7.
2.1 Harberger's General Equilibrium Tax Analyses
In the general equilibrium tax literature, Harberger's analyses of the
incidence and efficiency effects of taxes have been a major stimulus to
subsequent work. The Harberger approach enabled general equilibrium
effects to be quantified for the first time. Although our work in this book
goes further than that of Harberger in many ways, our dependence on
Harberger's work will be obvious to anyone familiar with the literature.
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The intersectoral allocation of capital in the Harberger general
equilibrium model.
classical assumptions. It is assumed that the aggregate supplies of capital
and labor are fixed, that factors are perfectly mobile among industries,
and that perfect competition exists in factor and product markets. Pro-
duction takes place under constant returns to scale. There are two sec-
tors, each of which produces a single, homogeneous output. Harberger
assumes a closed economy (i.e., there is no foreign trade). The model
considers the effects of a distorting tax on capital in one of the sectors.
1
The model is represented by a series of differential equations. For
discrete changes, the analysis is only a local approximation. Using esti-
mates of elasticities of substitution in production and consumption that
are based on econometric literature, Harberger generates estimates of
the incidence of particular taxes. Perhaps the most famous finding from
this model is that the corporate tax is borne by all capital owners,
regardless of whether their capital is used in incorporated enterprises.
Harberger also develops a procedure for estimating the welfare cost of
a distortionary factor tax. In the case of capital tax distortions, he consid-
ers the economy to be represented ty two sectors, "heavily taxed" and
"lightly taxed." These are represented as sectors X and Y in figure 2.1.
Each sector uses capital in production, and the marginal revenue product
schedules are assumed to be linear. The economy has a fixed capital
endowment. In the absence of any taxes, market forces will ensure that
capital is allocated between the two sectors such that the rate of return, 7,
is equal. If, instead, a tax operates on capital income in sectorX, the gross
1. A number of these assumptions have been relaxed in subsequent work. McLure has
extended the model to cover interregional incidence (1969), and has introduced immobile
factors (1971). Thirsk (1972) has extended the analysis to the case of three goods, and
Mieszkowski (1972) has considered the case of three factors. Anderson and Ballentine
(1976) have extended the analysis to incorporate the case of monopoly. Finally, Vanden-
dorpe and Friedlaender (1976) extend the Harberger formulation to encompass an initial
situation with a number of distortionary taxes.8 Chapter Two
rate of return, rg, in that sector must be such that the net rate of return, rn,
is equalized across the sectors. The difference between rg and rn is the tax
on each unit of capital used in sector X.
The situations with and without taxes are characterized by the capital
allocations (K$, Ky) and (Kx, K®), respectively. In figure 2.1, the area
ABKXKX represents the value of the lost output in sector X when Kx
decreases from Kx to Kx as the tax is imposed. EFKyK® represents the
value of the increased output of sector Y. Full employment guarantees
that K° - K
lx = K} - K°. The area ABCD (= ABK^KX - EFK$K°)
represents the welfare cost of the tax, L, and is given by:
(2.1) L = Vz(rg-rn)HKx = ViTAKx,
where t is the tax rate on capital in sector X. The tax rate can be
determined from readily available data. Harberger calculates A Kx by
solving his two-sector general equilibrium model for this variable.
In his 1964 paper, Harberger applies a similar form of local analysis in
an examination of the welfare costs of several key distortions in the tax
system. In this paper, he presents the generalized triangle formula for the
welfare cost of a distorting tax, upon which so much intuition for the size
of the distorting costs of taxes has subsequently been based.
This intuition is most easily seen in the simple case of an output tax on a
single product where the supply function is perfectly elastic. This is shown
in figure 2.2 where DD' is the compensated demand function.
The tax is assumed to be paid by suppliers of the product, so that the
supply curve in figure 2.2 shifts by the amount of the tax, and the quantity
bought in the presence of the tax falls from q0 to qx. At qx, the gross-of-tax
price represents the demand-side evaluation of the welfare gain from an
extra unit of production. The net-of-tax price represents the social oppor-
tunity cost of extra production. As long as the demand price exceeds the
net-of-tax supply price, a gain is thus possible from extra production, and
the shaded triangle in figure 2.2 is the welfare cost of the distorting tax.
Defining the difference between the gross-of-tax and net-of-tax prices
as Ap, and q0 — qt as Aq, the area of this triangle is the deadweight
loss, L:
(2.2) L = ViAqAp.
If units for q are chosen such that/? = 1 in the no-tax equilibrium, then
Ap = t, where t is the ad valorem tax rate. Defining the demand elasticity
as e gives Ag = eAp • qlp. Evaluated at q0 where p = 1 and Ap = t, we
have Aq = etq0. Thus,
(2.3) L = V2t
2zq0.
The deadweight loss increases with the square of the tax rate, and linearly
with elasticities.9 General Equilibrium Analysis
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Fig. 2.2 The excess burden of an output tax in partial equilibrium.
To evaluate the overall efficiency of this tax as a source of revenue, it is
sometimes useful to look at the deadweight loss per dollar of revenue R.
Since/? = tq0 initially (where/? = 1), we can rewrite the deadweight loss
formula as L — Vi feR. The deadweight loss per dollar of revenue is LIR
= ¥z te. Thus the deadweight loss per dollar of revenue is linear in t and e.
For comparison purposes, however, we may want to know the addi-
tional excess burden associated with a marginal dollar of revenue from
each tax instrument. The numerator of this ratio is
(2.4) dL/dt=etq0.
The denominator, dRIdt, is q0. Therefore, the marginal excess burden is
(r) ,-\ Marginal Loss _ etq0
Marginal Revenue <Zo
As noted by Browning (1976), Stuart (1984), and Ballard, Shoven, and
Whalley (1982), the marginal cost of an extra dollar raised from an
existing distorting tax exceeds the average welfare cost of all revenue
raised by the tax. In this simple model, marginal deadweight loss is twice
as great as average deadweight loss.
2.2 General Equilibrium Models
General equilibrium models have four essential ingredients—the en-
dowments of consumers, their demand functions, the production tech-
nology, and the conditions for equilibrium.
In general, consumers may possess endowments of any or all of the
commodities in the economy. The nonnegative economy-wide endow-
ments are given by the vector W; W,\> 0, / = 1,2,... ,N, where N is the
number of commodities. In our model, consumers only possess endow-10 Chapter Two
ments of capital and labor. Market demand functions are specified for
each commodity. Demands are nonnegative and depend in a continuous
manner on all prices. The market demand functions are denoted by
Dt(P), i = 1,. . ., N, where the vector P represents the TV market prices.
The demands are homogeneous of degree zero in all prices, i.e., if all
prices were to double, the quantities demanded would not change. Be-
cause of the homogeneity property, an arbitrary normalization of prices
can be chosen; a common treatment is to consider nonnegative prices that
sum to unity, i.e., prices that lie on the unit price simplex.
N
Commodity demands are also assumed to obey Walras's law, which states
that the value of market demands equals the value of endowments at any
set of prices, regardless of whether they are equilibrium prices. Market
demand functions are typically represented as the sum of the individual
household demand functions, each of which may or may not be derived
from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. In our model,
each representative consumer group has commodity demands derived
from constrained utility maximization.
On the production side of a general equilibrium model, technology is
usually described by a set of constant returns to scale activities, or by
production functions that exhibit nonincreasing returns to scale. The
advantage of the activity analysis approach is that the conditions for
equilibrium are especially simple when production is modeled in this way.
On the other hand, production functions are more convenient to use in
applied work. Production functions are easy to parameterize, since most
of the relevant econometric literature involves the estimation of produc-
tion functions.
In this chapter we describe both activity analysis production and con-
tinuous production functions. In subsequent chapters we will only use
production functions. With the activity analysis approach, each of the
constant returns to scale activities which is available to the economy is
represented as a vector of coefficients. Each coefficient, aik, represents
the input or output of good i when activity k is operated at unit intensity.
We adopt the convention that the aik are negative for inputs and positive
for outputs. If there are K activities, the coefficients can be arranged in an
(N x K) matrix, which we shall call A. The first N columns of this matrix
are usually disposal activities, which allow for costless disposal of each
commodity. Joint products are possible, i.e., an activity may have more
than one output. However, activities are restricted to satisfy the bound-
edness condition that at any nonnegative set of activity levels x, Ax + W
is bounded. The interpretation of this condition is that it excludes infinite
production of any of the commodities.11 General Equilibrium Analysis
In the case of a continuous production function with constant return to
scale, any set of prices leads to unique cost-minimizing input proportions.
We can think of a continuous production function as an infinite set of
activities.
Equilibrium in the activity analysis model is characterized by a non-
negative vector of prices and activity levels (P* x*), where the * denotes
the equilibrium level. At (P* x*), demands equal supplies for all com-
modities:
(2.6) DAP*) = X aikx% + Wt for i = 1, . . . , N.
k=l
Also, no activity makes positive profits, with those in use breaking even:
(2.7) X Pfaik ^ 0 ( = 0 if x% > 0) for k = 1, . . . , K.
A simplified numerical example of a model representative of those
actually used in this book may help in understanding the general equilib-
rium structure (see table 2.1). For expositional purposes, we consider a
model with two final goods (manufacturing and nonmanufacturing) and
two factors of production (capital and labor). We consider two classes of
consumers. Consumers have initial endowments of factors but have no
initial endowments of goods. The "rich" consumer group owns capital,
while the "poor" group owns labor. Production of each good takes place
Table 2.1 Specification of Production Parameters, Demand Parameters, and



























according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production func-
tion, and each consumer class has demands derived from maximizing a
CES utility function subject to its budget constraint.
The production functions are given by
(2.8) &• = <*>,-
°i = 1
i= 1,2,
where Qt denotes output of the i
th industry, $, is the scale or units
parameter, 8, is the distribution parameter, Kt and Lt are the factor
inputs, and cr, is the elasticity of factor substitution.
The CES utility functions are given by
a;— 1 1 a,— 1
(2.9)
where Dtj is the quantity of good / demanded by consumer;, a, are share
parameters, and a; is the substitution elasticity. If we maximize equation
(2.9), subject to the constraint that the consumer cannot spend more than
his income, (P1D1 + P2D2 < PLWL + PKWK), we get the demand functions:
OLjI
V * / '/ __ (TJ . _ 1 — IT.* , . . 1 — (T- . ' '
where / is income and Pt are market prices.
Once we have specified the parameters of these production and utility
functions, plus the individual endowments, we have a complete general
equilibrium model such as the one in table 2.1. Market-clearing condi-
tions require that supply equals demand for each good and factor, with no
excess profits. This model is much less complicated than the general
equilibrium model to which most of this book is devoted. Nevertheless,
the two models bear distinct formal similarities. Each can be solved with
any of several computational algorithms. In computing the equilibrium
prices for the system of table 2.1, we use an algorithm that searches across
the unit simplex. However, in reporting our results, we find it more
convenient to adopt the normalization that the price of labor is unity.
(We continue to use this normalization in later chapters.) The approxi-
mate solution for this illustrative model is shown in table 2.2. The
solution shows that, at these prices, the total demand for each output
exactly matches the amount produced. It follows that producer revenues
equal consumer expenditures. It also is true, to a high degree of approx-
imation, that the labor and capital endowments are fully employed and
that consumer factor incomes equal producer factor costs. The cost per13 General Equilibrium Analysis
Table 2.2 Equilibrium Solution for Illustrative Simple General Equilibrium




















































unit of output in each sector matches the price, meaning that economic
profits are zero. The expenditure of each household exhausts its income.
Thus the solution closely approximates all of the properties of an equilib-
rium for this economy. The degree of approximation can be improved by
increasing the amount of computation time allowed for the solution
algorithm.
Our general equilibrium analysis of the U.S. tax system follows closely
the approach of the example shown above. We construct a numerical
general equilibrium model for policy analysis, assuming that the data and
analysis are representative of conditions in the U.S. economy. Tax distor-
tions are introduced and equilibria are computed under different policy14 Chapter Two
regimes. Finally, since utility functions are explicitly specified, changes in
consumer welfare can easily be computed.
This set of exercises would not be particularly instructive if the equilib-
rium were not unique for any particular tax policy. There is no theoretical
argument that guarantees uniqueness in models of this type. Fortunately,
uniqueness has been demonstrated for the model used here in a paper by
Kehoe and Whalley (1982).
2.3 Incorporating Taxes in a General Equilibrium Model
We can incorporate a system of taxes and government expenditures
into our general equilibrium model. The taxes may apply to the purchases
of goods and services by consumers, the use of factors and intermediate
inputs by producers, and the final outputs of the various production
sectors. The tax rates may differ for each good, consumer, and producer.
The government uses the tax proceeds to finance transfer payments to
consumers and to purchase final goods and services. In our model, in
equilibrium, the government budget must be balanced, i.e., any govern-
ment income remaining after transfers to persons must be spent on
commodity purchases.
2
The methods for incorporating taxes into a formal general equilibrium
model are presented in Shoven and Whalley (1973). In order to get the
flavor of that analysis, consider the very simple case in which the only
taxes are consumer purchase taxes and the government makes no exhaus-
tive expenditures, i.e., all revenues are returned to consumers as transfer
payments. Each of the / consumers is assigned a vector of nonnegative ad
valorem tax rates, ey = (e1;, . . . , eNj), which must be paid on expendi-
tures on each of the N commodities. The total tax revenue, R, is used to
distribute among consumers according to a proportional distribution
scheme;
This scheme for tax revenue distribution leads to a fundamental prob-
lem that did not exist in a model with no government. The problem is one
of simultaneity. Consumers cannot determine their demands until they
know their incomes, and they do not know their incomes until they know
the amount of their transfer revenues. At the same time, the transfer
payments cannot be determined until the total revenue is known, and
revenue will not be known until consumers make their purchases.
2. The government could run deficits or surpluses if the model included a government
bond market. The model described in this book does not include bonds. For an attempt to
integrate a bond market into a general equilibrium model, see Feltenstein 1984.15 General Equilibrium Analysis
This problem of simultaneity can be solved if we model consumers and
producers as reacting to revenue as well as prices. That is, demand
functions depend on (P,R), where (P,R) denotes the vector (P1? . . . ,
PN,R). The market demand functions Di(P,R) are (as before) assumed
to be nonnegative, continuous functions. However, they are now
assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in the vector (P,R), which
means that a doubling of all prices and tax revenues will double both
incomes and consumer prices, so that physical quantities demanded are
unchanged. Whereas we previously normalized prices so that they fell on
the unit simplex in prices, (XfLi Pt = 1), we now use an augmented
simplex in prices and revenue (XfLi Pt + R = 1).
We still assume that the demand functions satisfy Walras's law. Now,
however, Walras's law states that the value of market demands, gross of
expenditure taxes, is equal to total consumer incomes:
(2.11) 2 2 PiDyftRXl + etj) = £ ( 2 PtWtj +
where D/; is the quantity of good i consumed by consumer/, and etj is the
ad valorem rate of expenditure tax on good i faced by consumer /.
Equation (2.11) will hold at any vector (P,R). In addition to vectors of
expenditure tax rates, each of the / consumers may be assigned a non-
negative income tax rate T; which is charged on taxable income.
3 We can
also model taxes which are levied on the production side of the economy.
In the model with activity analysis production, vectors of ad valorem tax
rates T
l can be assigned to each of the productive activities, where V =
(tik, . . . , tNk). We adopt the convention that tik are nonnegative for
outputs and nonpositive for inputs, such that the taxes paid will be
nonnegative. The producer who operates activity k at unit intensity will
incur a tax liability of 2£L i 0^,7-f,;. As before, competitive equilibria can
be examined, but now these equilibria reflect the presence of taxation.
Market prices have to be defined with care when taxation is introduced
into the economy. The prices included in the vector (P,R) are those
equalized across all the traders on any market. Thus, prices Pt are sellers'
prices for inputs (prices net-of-producer input taxes) and wholesale prices
for outputs (prices net-of-consumer purchase taxes, but gross of any
producer output taxes). An equilibrium in the presence of taxation is thus
a vector ((P* #*),(**)) such that:
N
(2.12) 2 /?+/?* = 1; P,* R* > 0; P? > 0 for at least one i.
i=\
3. Characteristics of income taxation systems, such as an annually exempt amount of
income or deductions for expenditures on particular commodities, can be incorporated into
the model, although these are ignored here to simplify the notation.16 Chapter Two
Once again, the * denotes the equilibrium level. In equilibrium, de-
mands equal supplies for all commodities:
(2.13) Di(P*,R*) = Wi+ I aikxt (/= 1 iV)-
k= 1
In equilibrium, no activity yields any producer the possibility of positive
profit after payment of producer taxes, with those activities in use just
breaking even:
(2.14) X P?aik(l -rft)<0 (= 0 if x% > 0) (k = 1,. . . , K).
i = l
In equilibrium the budget will be balanced, so that
(2.15) R*=% X aiktikPfx*K + t { e^D^R*) i=lk=l i=lj=l
The three terms on the right hand side of equation (2.15) are the revenue
from producer output taxes, consumer purchase taxes, and income taxes.
This approach to incorporating taxes in a general equilibrium model
can also be followed in a model with continuous production functions.
Production taxes would then apply to the capital and labor inputs, as well
as to outputs, consumer purchases, and incomes. The simultaneity in-
volving tax revenues in the evaluation of market functions remains, and it
necessitates characterizing the equilibrium in terms of prices and reve-
nues, as shown. Our model of the U.S. economy and tax system uses this
production function approach.
2.4 Computing General Equilibria with Taxes
Our general equilibrium model is sufficiently complicated that equilib-
rium prices cannot be determined analytically. Instead, we use a grid
search algorithm developed by Orin Merrill (1972). Merrill's algorithm is
based on an algorithm developed by Herbert Scarf (1967, 1973). Since
the focus of this book is on the tax model of the United States and its
policy applications, we devote only a short section to computational
method here. For descriptions of several such algorithms, the interested
reader is referred to Scarf (1973, 1981, 1984).
The algorithms of Scarf and Merrill are examples of methods that are
guaranteed to find fixed points of certain mappings. The algorithms can
be used to solve many types of computational problems, including many
noneconomic ones. For the models discussed here, we are able to formu-17 General Equilibrium Analysis
late the problem in such a way that fixed points and economic equilibria
are one and the same.
An intuitive grasp of Scarf's algorithm can be obtained by considering
a simple case of a mapping that meets the conditions necessary for the
Brouwer (1910) fixed-point theorem. The theorem states that, if 5 is a
nonnull, closed, bounded, convex set mapped into itself by the con-
tinuous mapping X—> F(X), then there exists a fixed point, i.e., a point
XeS for which F(X) = X.
Suppose that S is taken to be the unit interval (0,1), and the continuous
mapping is the function F(X), whose values all lie on the same unit
interval. A fixed point in this case is given by the intersection of the
correspondence (X,F(X)) and 45° line, as drawn in figure 2.3.
It is easy to find the fixed point Xin figure 2.3, since the problem is so
simple. This rapidly becomes more difficult as the dimension of the
problem increases. Scarf's algorithm exploits a property of graph theory
to provide an ingenious way of always finding a fixed point, X, irrespec-
tive of the dimensionality involved.
The intuition underlying this method can be illustrated with the same
diagram as in figure 2.3, redrawn with the unit interval on the X axis
subdivided into a number of line segments of equal length (see figure
2.4). Each end point of these line segments has associated with it a label
that is either 0 or 1. The label is calculated using the following rule: if
F(X) > X the label is 0, otherwise the label is 1.
By construction, the end points of the unit interval have the labels 0
and 1. Since all other points have either a label i or 0, there must exist a
line segment that has both labels. For this line segment, F(X) > Xat one










Using labels to approximate a fixed point.
continuous, a fixed point where F(X) = X must exist within this line
segment. If the number of these line segments becomes large, the approx-
imation to a fixed point represented by the completely labeled line
segment will be more accurate. In the limit, where a dense grid of points
on the line segment is approached, the calculation of the fixed point will
be exact.
Scarf's algorithm appeals to this idea in higher dimensional space. In
the case of an economic problem in which three prices are to be deter-
mined, we would deal with the unit simplex shown in figure 2.5.
A major accomplishment in general equilibrium economics was the
proof of the existence of an equilibrium (see Arrow and Debreu 1954;
Debreu 1959). This was achieved by finding a mapping that met the
conditions of Brouwer's theorem and whose fixed point could be inter-
preted as an economic equilibrium. The simplest such mapping is for a
model of pure exchange. Let gi{P) = Dt(P) - Wt be the excess demand
for commodity /. These excess demand functions are continuous since the
demand functions are continuous, and note that Walras's law states that
XfL i Pigi(P) = 0. Consider the following mapping of prices in the simplex
into image prices P'\
(2.16)
Pt + Max (0, gi(P))
1 + S Max (0, gi(P))
i=\
for * =19 General Equilibrium Analysis
PRICE OF GOOD 1
(1,0,0)
PRICE OF GOOD 2
(0,1,0)
PRICE OF GOOD 3
(0,0,1)
Fig. 2.5 The unit simplex.
Note that
(2.17)






1 + X Max (0, gi(P))
and that P- ^ 0 for all i. Thus P' is on the unit simplex and a continuous
function of P. Therefore, the conditions of Brouwer's theorem apply, and
a fixed point of this mapping must exist. At this fixed point where P- = Pt,
all gi ^ 0, which is the condition for equilibrium in a pure exchange
model.
This existence proof made it possible to contemplate the problem of
computing an economic equilibrium. Unfortunately, however, the
Brouwer mapping demonstration of existence does not readily suggest a
computational procedure. The computational methods use labels as dem-
onstrated above and an ingenious numerical analysis technique of Lemke
and Howson (1964). For the three-dimensional pure exchange problem
of figure 2.5, one could examine a large number of candidate equilibrium
price vectors on the simplex. The label for any point could be the number
associated with the commodity with the largest excess demand. Along
each side of the simplex, where one commodity price is zero, the label
would be that commodity number. We might expect that the simplex
would be labeled in a manner somewhat like figure 2.6.20 Chapter Two
Vertical lines : Label = 1
Dots: Label = 2
Horizontal lines: Label =3
Fig. 2.6 Economic equilibrium in the three-good case.
In figure 2.6, equilibrium will be at point A. At any one time, Scarf's
algorithm examines N price vectors that are close together in a sense that
he defines precisely. The algorithm can be shown to converge to a set of N
candidate vectors that are very close together, each of which has a
different label. If each price vector is labeled with the number of the
commodity with the largest excess demand and if each vector has a
different label, then each of these excess demands must be nearly zero.
This is true because Walras's law states that at any specific price vector,
the price-weighted sum of the excess demands is zero:
(2.18)
The excess demands are continuous, and if within a very small region of
the price simplex each commodity has the largest excess demand, then
the excess demands must all be close to zero. Thus, this labeling tech-
nique results in the computation of a fixed point that represents an
economic equilibrium.
For a general equilibrium model with taxes, the necessary labels are
described in Shoven and Whalley (1973). This involves using the tradi-
tional price simplex used in most general equilibrium models, but aug-
mented by one additional dimension for tax revenue. The labeling proce-
dure outlined by Shoven and Whalley is for a general equilibrium model
with production, with taxes on both producers and consumers. Their21 General Equilibrium Analysis
labeling rule guarantees that a subsimplex that is completely labeled
provides the required approximation to a general equilibrium with taxes.
The problem with Scarf's algorithm is that it uses a relatively large
amount of computational time. It starts at a corner of the simplex and
therefore usually evaluates the excess demands at many points before
approaching an approximate equilibrium. Even if we have a good guess
about where the equilibrium might be, we cannot use that information.
Also, since the algorithm uses a fixed grid of candidate price vectors, it is
not possible to improve the accuracy of the solution once we find an
approximate equilibrium. Consequently, there is a stringent trade-off
between accuracy and computational time. For the calculations used in
this book, we use Merrill's algorithm, because it overcomes these prob-
lems while still guaranteeing convergence. Other algorithms of this type
which allow for fast computations are those of Kuhn and MacKinnon
(1975), Eaves (1972), and van der Laan and Talman (1979).
2.5 Equal Yield Equilibria
In this section we describe an important extension to the general
equilibrium approach to tax policy. Through the use of an equal-tax-yield
equilibrium concept, we are able to undertake "differential" analysis in
the tradition of Musgrave (1959). Such analysis allows an existing tax to
be replaced by an alternative tax system that raises equivalent revenue.
This change in procedure allows us to maintain the size of government
when the effects of an existing tax are evaluated. This is important, since
a changing size of government can contaminate model findings. Because
we are interested here in the effects of changes in the structure rather
than the level of taxes, we want to be able to interpret our results without
worrying about changes in the pattern of total demands that are caused by
changes in the amount of government spending.
The exact meaning of equal revenue yield is somewhat unclear be-
cause, in general, the adoption of a new tax regime will lead to different
equilibrium prices. It is not satisfactory merely to give the government
the same number of dollars as it had before the tax change, since the
goods that government buys with those dollars will have changed in price.
Shoven and Whalley (1977) discuss a variety of price indexes that might
be used to correct for these price changes, so as to preserve equal "real"
revenue.
In the present model we do not use price indexes as such. Instead, we
give the government a utility function, and then use the corresponding
expenditure function to calculate the revenue required for the govern-
ment to achieve constant utility at any set of prices. The expenditure
function expresses the amount of money necessary to attain a given level
of utility at a given set of prices. When we calculate a base-case equilib-22 Chapter Two
Hum, we calculate the government's utility. In equilibrium calculations
for changes in tax regime, we give the government enough revenue so
that it reaches the same level of utility. This is the exact sense in which we
preserve "real" government revenue.
Most of the simulations reported in this book involve reductions in
revenues. This is the case for corporate tax integration and for the
adoption of a consumption tax. In these cases, equal yield calculations
involve increasing taxes somewhere else in the economy.
In general, a number of replacement tax schemes could be used.
However, it is simplest to consider only those schemes where the replace-
ment tax can be expressed in terms of a single scalar. In using our model,
we employ four such replacement schemes.
1. Lump-Sum Taxes. In this case, the reduction in revenues caused by
a tax change is recovered by lump-sum taxes paid by each consumer
group. The weights for the division of these taxes among the household
groups are fixed, but the size of the lump-sum taxes in aggregate is
determined endogenously.
2. Additive Changes to Marginal Income Tax Rates. Here revenues are
recovered by adding the same number of percentage points to all house-
hold marginal income tax rates.
3. Multiplicative Changes to Marginal Income Tax Rates. In this case,
revenues are recovered by multiplying the marginal tax rates of all
households by the same scalar. (Thus the rates of the higher-bracket
taxpayers are increased by higher absolute amounts.)
4. Multiplicative Changes to Consumer Sales Tax Rates. In this case,
we raise the required revenue by multiplying the consumer sales tax rates
facing all consumers by the same scalar.
Distributional effects clearly depend upon this choice of tax replace-
ment. We also consider a few cases in which additional revenues are
created by the tax change. Examples are the adoption of a value-added
tax or reductions in deductions for saving. In these instances we use
yield-preserving subsidies instead of taxes. Once again, we use subsidies
of the lump-sum, additive, and multiplicative types.
We should note that there is no guarantee that equal yield equilibria
will always exist. Obviously, we could not replace the entire revenue
system of the United States with a tax on popcorn. We typically consider
broadly based replacement taxes, in order to minimize the possibility of
being unable to calculate an equal yield equilibrium.
2.6 Computations in the Space of Factor Prices
Even though we use Merrill's algorithm for our equilibrium computa-
tions, we are still concerned with reducing computational costs in every
way possible. The amount of time required to compute an equilibrium at23 General Equilibrium Analysis
any level of accuracy increases rapidly with the number of dimensions.
Until now, we have described general equilibrium tax models as if a
separate price must be computed for every commodity in the model. A
convenient procedure to use in computation is to reduce the number of
prices by expressing some of the commodity prices as functions of other
prices. In our model we separate commodities into goods and factors, and
calculate goods prices from factor prices. Since we use a fixed-coefficient
input-output matrix with no joint products, we are able to use the
Samuelson (1951) nonsubstitution theorem to calculate goods prices
directly from factor prices. This enables us to compute an equilibrium in
the space of factor prices rather than the space of all commodity prices,
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Competitive equilibrium achieved when:
1. Demands equal supplies for all goods and factors
2. Zero profits (net of taxes) prevail in all industries
Flow diagram of factor space calculations in general equilib-
rium tax model.24 Chapter Two
reducing greatly the cost of computation. In our model we calculate
equilibria in three dimensions—the factor prices, capital and labor—and
an additional dimension for government revenues.
In figure 2.7 we present a stylized version of the way in which our factor
space computations work. The starting point is factor prices. Using factor
prices and the conditions for cost minimization by producers, we can
evalutate the cost-covering prices of goods. This directly imposes the zero
profit condition for each industry. When consumers know their incomes
and the prices of goods, they can calculate their demands for goods. If
producers meet demands, this gives derived demands for factors, which
results in a system of two-factor excess demand correspondences (capital
and labor), and a government budget imbalance. An equilibrium is
attained when all three correspondences equal zero.